UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

8-27-2014

State v. Denton Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 41512

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
Recommended Citation
"State v. Denton Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 41512" (2014). Not Reported. 1661.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/1661

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
ST ATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff~Respondent,

v.

)
)
)
)

)

SHANE ROY DENTON,

___________
Defendant-Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)

NO. 41512
TWIN FALLS COUNTY NO.
CR 2012-13926
REPLY BRIEF

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS

HONORABLE ERIC J. WILDMAN
District Judge

SARA B. THOMAS
State Appellate Public Defender
State of Idaho
I.S.B. #5867
ERIK R. LEHTINEN
Chief, Appellate Unit
I.S.B. #6247

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534

BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #8701
3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100
Boise, ID 83703
(208) 334-2712

ATTORNEYS FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................... ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................................................................ 1
Nature of the Case ..................................................................................... 1
Statement of the Facts and
Course of Proceedings ............................................................................... 1
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL ....................................................................... 2
ARGUMENT .......................................................................................................... 3
The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct Rising To The Level Of
Fundamental Error By Misstating The Law, Vouching For A
Witness, And Disparaging Defense Counsel ................................................... 3
A. The Prosecutorial Misconduct Is Clear From The Face Of The
Record, Given The Statements Actually Made By The
Prosecutor .............................................................................................. 3
1. The Prosecutor Committed Clear Misconduct By Misrepresenting
The Law To The Jury ............................................................................ 3
2. The Prosecutor Committed Clear Misconduct By Vouching For
The State's Witnesses .......................................................................... 5
3. The Prosecutor Committed Clear Misconduct By Disparaging
Defense Counsel .................................................................................. 7
B. These Errors Prejudiced Mr. Denton ........................................................ 10
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................... 12
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING ............................................................................... 13

Cases
Rife v. Long, 127 Idaho 841 (1995) ....................................................................... 5
State v. Baruth, 107 Idaho 651 (Ct. App. 1984) .................................................... 9
State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53 (2011) ................................................................. 8
State v. Erickson, 148 Idaho 679 (Ct. App. 2010) ................................................ .4
State v. Higgins, 122 Idaho 590 (1992) .................................................................8
State v. Page, 135 Idaho 214 (2000) .................................................................... 8
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010) .............................................................. 3, 1O

Rules
I.R.E. 801 .............................................................................................................6
I.R.E. 803(4) ..........................................................................................................6
I.R.E. 806 ..............................................................................................................4

Additional Authorities

D. Craig Lewis, Idaho Trial Handbook §18.3, at pp.205-06 ................................... 9

ii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Shane Denton appeals, contending that, during the closing arguments in his trial
for attempted strangulation, there was prosecutorial misconduct - erroneous statements
of law, vouching for a witness, and disparaging defense counsel - which rises to the
level of fundamental error.

The State responds, contending that all the challenged

statements were comments on the evidence or drew inferences from the evidence, and
as such, there is no error clear from the face of the record. It also contends that the jury
was sufficiently instructed, so that any error was not prejudicial.
The State is mistaken.

The State's arguments do not address the actual

comments made by the prosecutor in closing, but rather, the arguments the State
believes the prosecutor was trying to make. The actual arguments do show clear error.
Additionally, despite the fact that there is a presumption that the jury follows the district
court's instructions, there is still a reasonable possibility that the prosecutor's erroneous
statements contributed to the verdict in this case.
Since Mr. Denton has demonstrated fundamental error through prosecutorial
misconduct in this case, this Court should vacate his conviction and remand this case
for a new trial.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Denton's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUE
Whether the prosecutor committed misconduct rising to the level of fundamental error
by misstating the law, vouching for a witness, and disparaging defense counsel.
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ARGUMENT
The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct Rising To The Level Of Fundamental Error By
Misstating The Law, Vouching For A Witness, And Disparaging Defense Counsel
The State does not challenge Mr. Denton's assertion that, if there was
prosecutorial misconduct, it would infringe on his constitutional rights, and as such,
does not challenge his argument on the first prong of the fundamental error analysis.

(See generally Resp. Br.; see App. Br., pp.5-6.) Rather, it focuses its arguments on the
second and third prongs of the fundamental error analysis: whether there is error clear
on the face of the record, and whether that error prejudiced the defendant. See State v.

Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010). However, the State's arguments on those points are
misplaced. Considering the actual statements made by the prosecutor, rather than the
arguments the State believes the prosecutor was trying (but failing) to make, this record
demonstrates clear and prejudicial error, and thus, fundamental error.

A.

The Prosecutorial Misconduct Is Clear From The Face Of The Record, Given
The Statements Actually Made By The Prosecutor

1.

The Prosecutor Committed Clear Misconduct By Misrepresenting The Law
To The Jury

Mr. Denton argued that the prosecutor committed misconduct by arguing that
"You can't use double hearsay to prove somebody is inconsistent. You have to ask the
person who made the comment and allow them to respond."

(Tr., Vol.2, p.211,

Ls.10-12.) This statement refers to the defense's attack on H.D.'s version of events by
introducing contradictory statements in Officer Gates' report of her interview of
H.D. through Officer Gates' testimony.
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1.R.E. 806 specifically states that defense counsel did not have to confront
H.D. with the inconsistency, and the district court properly overruled the State's hearsay
objection in regard to introducing Officer Gates' testimony and Officer Gates' report.
(See App. Br, p.8.) For the prosecutor to have claimed otherwise was a misstatement
of the law, which constitutes misconduct.
However, the State contends that this is not misconduct because the prosecutor
was simply asking the jury to draw inferences about H.D.'s credibility from the evidence
presented, or inversely, draw an inference from the evidence not presented.

(Resp.

Br., pp.7-8.) The State's argument is misplaced because it does not address the actual
statements made by the prosecutor.

Rather, the State's contention is related to the

arguments the State believes the prosecutor was trying to (but ultimately failed to)
make. The State's argument is inappropriate, since review of potential misconduct on
appeal is focused on the statements the prosecutor actually made to the jury. See, e.g.,
State v. Erickson, 148 Idaho 679, 684 (Ct. App. 2010) (holding that, in considering a
violation of a pretrial ruling, "[w]hatever the prosecutor's intent, it was misconduct for
him to [introduce] this evidence").
Specifically, the State's argument on appeal is that the prosecutor was asking the
jury to not give weight to H.O.'s comments to Officer Gates because she was not given
a chance to explain the inconsistency, or because the inconsistency was caused by
Officer Gates' incomplete or inaccurate report of H.D.'s comments.

(Resp. Br., p.7.)

However, the prosecutor actually told the jury that "You can't use double hearsay to
prove somebody is inconsistent. You have to ask the person who made the comment
and allow them to respond." (Tr., Vol.2, p.211, Ls.10-12 (emphasis added).) "Cannot"
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and "have to" are mandatory in nature, telling the jury that it has no choice but to reach
the same conclusion as the prosecutor, whereas asking them to reach a conclusion is
permissive, and allows the jurors to agree or disagree with the prosecutor based on
their own evaluation of the evidence. Compare Rife v. Long, 127 Idaho 841, 848 (1995)
(holding that the term "must" establishes a mandatory duty to act in a certain manner,
whereas "may" would authorize, but not require, the proscribed action).

By arguing

under the permissive language, the State changes the entire nature of the prosecutor's
actual statements, which does not comport with the standard of review.
The prosecutor's actual argument told the jurors that they were required, as a
matter of law, to disregard the inconsistency of H.D.'s version of events demonstrated
by Officer Gates' report because the law did not allow them to properly consider Officer
Gates' testimony in that regard, absent giving H.D. an opportunity to explain.

As

established in the Appellant's Brief, this misstates the law, and misstatements of the law
constitute prosecutorial misconduct.

(App. Br., pp.6-8.)

Therefore, given the actual

statements made by the prosecutor, the misconduct in this regard is clear from the face
of the record.

2.

The Prosecutor Committed Clear Misconduct By Vouching For The State's
Witnesses

Mr. Denton contended that the prosecutor committed misconduct by vouching for
the credibility of Dr. Ellsworth when the prosecutor argued that, "[w]hat she
[Dr. Ellsworth] does is she takes the medical history. She takes down what she's told
by the victim. Why isn't that hearsay under Idaho law? Because it's believed that any
statements you make to a doctor are statements that you make to tell them about your
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injuries." (Tr. Vol.2, p.182, Ls.4-8.) The State contends that those statements were
appropriate because they were based on a correct statement of the law (that
Dr. Ellsworth's report was admissible pursuant

to I.R.E. 803(4)). (Resp. Br., p.9.) The

State's argument is wrong on two levels.
First, the State's contention misconstrues the actual argument the prosecutor
made. The prosecutor argued that Dr. Ellsworth's testimony was not hearsay. That is
not a correct statement of the law, as it is not consistent with rules of evidence which
define hearsay.

As Dr. Ellsworth's testimony recounted an out-of-court statement

offered for the truth of the matter asserted, it was, in fact, hearsay. I.R.E. 801. There is
simply an exception to hearsay rules that allow such testimony to be admissible, even
though it constitutes hearsay.

I.R.E. 803(4).

Thus, the State's contention - that the

prosecutor did not commit misconduct because she made an argument premised on a
correct statement of the law - is erroneous given the actual argument made by the
prosecutor, and so, should be rejected.
The second problem with the State's contention in this regard is that the
prosecutor's statements were not comments on the evidence.

For example, the

prosecutor might have discussed which statements in Dr. Ellsworth's report suggest that
it is an accurate account of the events in question, or she might have discussed the
consistency between those reports and H.D.'s testimony at trial. Instead, the prosecutor
went beyond the permissible scope of closing arguments, and declared the witness to
be credible because her statement was properly admitted under the law. By arguing
that Dr. Ellsworth's statements are not hearsay, the prosecutor was telling the jury that,
because Dr. Ellsworth's statements are admissible, the jury should find Dr. Ellsworth's

6

testimony credible. That constitutes vouching because, in essence, the prosecutor put
the prestige of Idaho's Rules of Evidence behind the State's witness.
The fact that the prosecutor was vouching for Dr. Ellsworth is particularly obvious
in this case, where the prosecutor also argued that the contradicting witness's testimony
was not properly admitted as a matter of law under those same hearsay rules. The
result was an argument by the prosecutor that Dr. Ellsworth was more credible than
Officer Gates because Dr. Ellsworth's testimony was legally admissible, whereas Officer
Gates' testimony was not.

That is not a proper comment on the evidence or an

appropriate articulation of an inference to be drawn therefrom. It is a comment directly
on the credibility of the witnesses themselves, and therefore, constitutes improper
vouching.

(App. Br., pp.9-10.) That constitutes misconduct, and it is clear from the

actual statements made by the prosecutor on the face of the record.

3.

The Prosecutor Committed Clear Misconduct By Disparaging Defense
Counsel

Mr. Denton contended that the prosecutor committed misconduct by arguing that:
[Defense counsel] never challenged [H.D.] on any of those
[inconsistencies]. He didn't pick [her statement] up and say, didn't you say
here in your statement da-da-da-da-da-da. He never asked her because
he didn't want her to say, that's not what I said. What does he do? He
waits and gets Officer Gates on the stand and says [H.D.] told you this
and that's inconsistent isn't it? ... So if you can't point out discrepancies
in somebody's testimony to that person, let's use somebody else.

You know, if you can't break your witness, if you can't make them say
something inconsistent, what do you do? You go after law enforcement.
So, sure enough, let's go after Officer Gates.
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(Tr., Vol.2, p.210, L.20 - p.211, L.2; Tr., Vol.2, p.212, Ls.19-21.) This constituted an
inappropriate comment disparaging defense counsel and how he decided to argue the
case, rather than commenting on the evidence itself. The State responds that, because
"the prosecutor did not malign the role of defense counsel," that all the prosecutor did
was "point[] out what defense counsel did, what evidence defense counsel elicited, and
what evidence counsel did not elicit from [H.D.)," there was no misconduct.
Br., p.11 (emphasis added).)

(Resp.

The State's argument is overly narrow in assessing

whether the prosecutor has committed misconduct.
The touchstone of the analysis for misconduct is whether the prosecutor is
making statements which might inflame the jurors' passions or prejudices in order to
secure a guilty verdict. See, e.g., State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 64 (2011) (holding
that the challenged statements constituted misconduct because they constituted
"attempt[s] by the prosecutor to influence the jury's passions and prejudices");

State v. Higgins, 122 Idaho 590, 600 (1992) (recognizing that there is misconduct
"where the record shows that the prosecuting attorney has been guilty of misconduct
calculated to inflame the minds of the jurors and arouse passion or prejudice against the
accused by statements in his argument of the facts not proved by the evidence")
(internal quotation marks omitted).

A prosecutor commits misconduct (inflames the

prejudices of the jury) by attacking the particular defense attorney in a given case, or by
maligning the role of defense counsel generally, since either argument might cause the
jury to convict based on its dislike of defense counsel, rather than the evidence
presented at trial. See State v. Page, 135 Idaho 214, 223 (2000) (recognizing that a
prosecutor may commit misconduct by personally attacking the defense attorney in the
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given case); State v. Baruth, 107 Idaho 651, 657 (Ct. App. 1984) (recognizing that a
prosecutor may commit misconduct by disparaging the role of defense counsel).
By limiting the analysis to only whether the prosecutor maligned the role of
defense counsel (Resp. Br., p.11 ), the State improperly narrows the question on appeal.
Mr. Denton's case is an example of a prosecutor trying to inflame the prejudices of the
jurors by attacking the defense attorney in this case:

"[defense counse~ never

challenged [H.D.] on any of those [inconsistencies]," "he didn't pick [her statement] up
and say ... ," "[h]e never asked her . . . . "

(Tr., Vol.2, p.210, L.20 - p.211, L.2

(emphasis added).) More than that, the prosecutor argued that defense counsel made
these decisions because he did not want the jury to hear H.D.'s explanation of the
inconsistency1: "He never asked her because he didn't want her to say, that's not what
I said . ... if you can't break your witness, if you can't make them say something

inconsistent, what do you do? You go after law enforcement." (Tr., Vol.2, p.210, Ls.23-

24; Tr., Vol.2, p.212, Ls.19-21 (emphasis added).)

These statements not only

disparage defense counsel's strategy in this case ("[he] never _challenged [H.D.)" or "he
never asked her"), but they also, contrary to the State's assertion on appeal, disparage
the role of defense counsel in this case ("if you can't make them say something
inconsistent, what do you do? You go after law enforcement"). These statements are
nothing more than an attempt to inflame the passions of the jury against defense

The prosecutor decided to attack defense counsel's decision to not confront
H.D. about the inconsistencies in her closing arguments even though the proper method
under the law to address this issue would have been for the prosecutor to recall H.D.
and introduce H.D.'s explanation of that contradiction into evidence. See D. Craig
Lewis, Idaho Trial Handbook §18.3, at pp.205-06. Thus, it was actually the prosecutor's
error that kept H.D.'s explanation of the inconsistency from the jury, making her attack
on defense counsel in that regard even more problematic.
1
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counsel by portraying him as trying to mislead the jury about the facts ("because he
didn't want her to say .... ") and unjustly attacking the credibility of another witness ("if
you can't make them say something inconsistent, what do you do? You go after law
enforcement") rather than arguing about the facts as they had actually been presented
into evidence.

This also demonstrates that the State's contention -

that the

prosecutor's arguments were properly limited to comments on the actual evidence (see
Resp. Br., pp.10-12) -presented is also erroneous.
Thus, considering the prosecutor's comments under the proper scope of
evaluation, they constitute clear misconduct on the face of the record.

B.

These Errors Prejudiced Mr. Denton
The State's only argument in regard to Mr. Denton's claim of prejudice is that the

jury was instructed on its proper role, specifically, what statements it could and could
not consider as evidence in its deliberations. (Resp. Br., pp.8-11.) Because the jury is
presumed to follow those instructions, the State concludes that there was no prejudice
in this case. (Resp. Br., pp.8-11.) However, the fact that there is a presumption that the
jury will follow the instructions does not, ipso facto, mean that there is no prejudice in
this case.

The State's argument asserts that the presumption forces an irrefutable

conclusion, rather than the proper perspective - that the presumption sets forth a
conclusion that can be disproved by the facts in the record. To show prejudice (i.e., to
overcome that presumption), the defendant must show that "there is a reasonable
possibility that the error affected the outcome of the trial." Perry, 150 Idaho at 226.
Mr. Denton has met the burden set forth in Perry, demonstrating that the facts in this
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case do show prejudice, and thus, has overcome the presumption that the jury's verdict
was reached in accord with the instructions.
In this case, the defense's primary tactic was to show there was, at least, a
reasonable doubt as to whether events unfolded as H.D. testified they had. (R., pp.22225.) Each of the statements constituting misconduct was aimed at getting the jury to
disregard the evidence presented in support of that theory: (1) the evidence supporting
that theory was not legally available for consideration by the jury; (2) the witness
contradicting the defense's theory was, as a matter of law, credible, because her
statements were legally available for consideration by the jury; and (3) defense counsel
was deliberately not presenting the full picture to the jury in regard to the evidence
supporting that theory. Thus, while the jury had been instructed that it could consider all
the evidence presented in the case, and that the statements of the lawyers were not,
themselves, evidence, there is a reasonable possibility that the jury decided not to
consider the evidence contradicting H.D.'s version of events based on any one of the
prosecutor's erroneous statements. Thus, even starting with the presumption the State
advocates, the facts of this case overcome that presumption and show that the
prosecutorial misconduct prejudiced Mr. Denton.
Therefore, Mr. Denton has demonstrated that the prosecutorial misconduct rose
to the level of fundamental error because they were so egregious or inflammatory that
they deprived Mr. Denton of his constitutional rights to a fair trial and due process.
Therefore, this Court should vacate the conviction and remand this case for a new trial.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Denton respectfully requests that this Court vacate the guilty verdict and the
judgment of conviction and remand this case for a new trial.
DATED this 27 th day of August, 2014.

BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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